[TFR 42-1]

[handwritten "No. 1"]

		COUNCIL OF MINISTERS USSR
		to Comrade I.V. STALIN
		to Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV
		to Comrade L.P. BERIA
	TsK VKP(b)	to Comrade G.M. MALENKOV
17 Sep 1950		COUNCIL OF MINISTERS USSR
		to Comrade N.A. BULGANIN

No. 7134/0 **Regarding the detention on Korean territory of the former Commander of the American 24th Infantry Division, Major General DEAN**

I am reporting that, according to a report from the MGB USSR advisor attached to the organs of State Security of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [white-out, possible name], the former Commander of the American 24th Infantry Division, Major General (Infantry) William Frichi DEAN, was detained on 25 Aug 1950 on Korean territory.

General DEAN was detained under the following circumstances:

The 24th Infantry Division Headquarters was routed on 21 Jul 1950 during a breakthrough in the front line near Tehzhon by forces of the People's Army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In connection with this, the Americans initially reported in the press and by radio that the 24th Infantry Division Commander, General DEAN, was missing in action after this operation, then later reported that he had been killed.

Since DEAN's body had not been found, an intensive search for it was undertaken by MVD Border Troops of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

On 25 Aug 1950, during a thorough search of a mountainous area, a disheveled American army soldier came out from the hills, stopped an elderly peasant on the road and demanded at gunpoint to be taken to the front line.

The elderly peasant, realizing that a fugitive American stood before him, took him to a Korean Border Detachment, where he [TFR 42-2]

was detained.

The identity of the detainee was established as American General DEAN.

During capture, DEAN attempted to use a weapon.

From the moment of capture until 8 Sep 1950, DEAN was not interrogated because he was seriously ill.

While being interrogated from 8-10 Sep 1950 by organs of the MVD Korea, DEAN testified that he was born in 1899 in Illinois (USA) into the family of a private doctor. He entered the Army in 1922 after completing a degree in literature and has served continuously since then. During his period of service, he has completed three military schools and also the military industrial and the military infantry academies. He served in the US and on the Hawaiian Islands until 1944. In 1944, first as second-in- command and then as an infantry division commander, he participated in allied airborne operations in France, where he remained until the end of the war. In July 1945, he returned with his division to the US. In 1947, he was appointed chief of the American military administration in Korea. From August 1948 to January 1949, he commanded the 7th Infantry Division in Seoul. In January 1949, he was transferred with his division to Japan, and on 2 July Dean returned from Japan to Korea to take command of the 24th Infantry Division.

During the interrogations, DEAN at first attempted to resist giving any testimony. But after he was told that the American Government considers him dead and that he is completely in the hands of the Korean People's Army Command, he began to testify. So far, only insignificant testimony has been given, in particular, the number of personnel and armaments of the 24th Division, which he commanded.

The interrogation of General DEAN continues.

Further results of Dean's interrogation will be reported to you.

Typed 7 copies
[cut off] - addressees
[cut off] - Secretary, MGB USSR
[cut off] - 1st Directorate, MGB USSR

DEPUTY MINISTER OF STATE SECURITY
USSR
(S. OGOL'TSOV) [TFR 42-3]

MEMORANDUM

from Lieutenant General SHALIN's enciphered telegram addressed to Lieutenant General RAZUVAEV dated 17 Jan 1951.

No. 382

In response to telegram No.77/sh from Comrade RAZUVAEV, the following order is given. Our translators are categorically forbidden to interrogate American and British POWs or prisoners of any other nationalities.

True Copy [signature]
(B. ZANEGIN)

"20" Jan 1951

Printed 1 copy
Originator: Major Zanegin
17 Jan 1951

[handwritten "opis' 23481, delo 1, l. 7"] [TFR 42-4]

[handwritten "16 6"]

MEMORANDUM

from Lieutenant General Razuvaev's enciphered telegram addressed to Lieutenant General Shalin

No. 500077/sh-77sh

Comrade RAZUVAEV raises the question of reinforcing the group of advisors attached to the Intelligence Directorate of the KNA General Staff with advisors (at the expense of regular, Soviet advisory-group positions in Korea) and with English-language translators.

In view of the lack of qualified English translators in the KNA, Comrade RAZUVAEV is petitioning to enlist the services of our translators for the interrogation of American prisoners.

NOTE: Comrade General of the Army SHTEMENKO has appended instructions to this telegram which forbid the interrogation of American and British prisoners by our translators.

True Copy: [signature]

(B. ZANEGIN)

"31" Jan 1951

[handwritten "Opis' 23481, delo 1, l. 6"]

[TFR 42-5]

[handwritten "34"]

From a list of particular, informational issues subject to examination in the first quarter of 1951. Dated 6 February 1951. [The above type is different from the original portion of this document below.]

- 2 -

5. Size of the aircraft fleet, and also number of tanks and artillery pieces in the Kuomintang forces.

6. Determine the airfields capable of basing jet-engine aircraft and aircraft with a take-off weight of 60[?] tons or more.

ON KOREA

1. Ascertain the latest measures of the South Korean command towards building up its armed forces.
2. Ascertain the latest organizational changes in tactical formations and units of the South Korean army; verify data concerning the presence of tank and anti-tank battalions in infantry divisions.
3. Determine the organization of the higher military administration (Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and others).
4. Ascertain the number of personnel and organization of the American advisory apparatus in the South Korean Army.
5. Ascertain the number and types of tanks in tactical formations and units of the US ground forces.
6. Ascertain air-raid bombing routes and American air losses, separately by anti-aircraft fire, fighter planes, etc.
7. Through interrogation of captured pilots, ascertain the morale of flight personnel; intensity of aircraft flights by type (heavy and medium bombers, fighters); personnel, deployment, formation time and the tactical nature of the 6002nd, 6140th, 6131st, 6138th, 6147th Tactical Support Wings; quantity of B-45 jet-engine bombers and F-84 jet fighters, and the units to which these aircraft are attached and where they are deployed.
8. Through interrogation of prisoners and by other means, ascertain which American forces are in Japan, and whether or not Koreans are being trained in Japan for combat against the KNA and

Chinese volunteers in Korea.

NOTE: Interrogation of POWs is to be conducted within the capabilities of KNR intelligence. Participation in the interrogations by officers of the advisory group is categorically forbidden.

[handwritten check mark next to the above note]
[handwritten "Opis' 22571, delo 3, l. 94"]
[TRF 42-6]

[illeg. handwritten instructions to Comrade Ivanov]

REPORT

from the senior advisor on the status of intelligence in the KNDR.

Colonel SEREGIN reports: I presented myself to the Senior Military Adviser, Comrade Lieutenant General RAZUVAEV, on 3 January 1953. I received instructions to become familiar with work conditions by 15 Jan 1953 and not to undertake any kind of measures. In the course of becoming acquainted with the work, I am able to report the following preliminary findings:

1. The Korean Peoples' Army is operating in the secondary sector of the front and is fully subordinate to the Combined Staff. It does not have the right to independently plan or conduct operations.

2. The Intelligence Directorate and intelligence in general do not receive due attention from the military command. The primary leadership staff changes often. The Intelligence Directorate is extremely poorly supported with materials, in particular with transportation vehicles and communications equipment. Reconnaissance missions are not assigned by the commanders of tactical formations, but rather, intelligence officers who, not having proper authority, do not always have at their disposal the means for organizing effective reconnaissance. Signals intelligence is extremely poorly organized. Air reconnaissance does not exist. The Intelligence Directorate does not have communications with partisan detachments operating in the enemy's rear. In view of the lack of communications and the difficulties involved in sending agents across enemy lines, covert intelligence does not have the necessary effect. The largest percentage of prisoners and captured enemy equipment goes to the Combined Staff; very little goes to our Korean comrades.

[handwritten text in margin "Instruct Comrade Seregin through the Senior Military Adviser to present a detailed report by 15 March 1953 on the status of the work of the advisee organ with concrete suggestions for a fundamental improvement in the work of the intelligence directorate.

Study the possibility of sending the intelligence advisor attached to the Chinese volunteers on temporary duty to the KNDR to render assistance in organizing and conducting intelligence operations and using the resources of Chinese military intelligence in the KNDR to obtain ..." [document ends in middle of a word, probably "information." or "foreign..."]

[handwritten "Opis' 23481, delo 3, l. 8"] [1-2 crossed out] [TFR 42-7] Originator, our entry No. 282

To Comrade S.R. SAVCHENKO

In reference to No.1218/s dated 7 March 1951

The 2nd Chief Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army is not conducting espionage operations among prisoners of those nationalities which you indicated, who are being held in camps of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea.

original signed M. SHALIN

"10" March 1951

True Copy: [signature] Zamtsov

No. 998787

[handwritten "opis' 23481, delo 1, l. 12"] [TFR 42-8]

Originator, our entry No.282

To Comrade S.R.
SAVCHENKO

In reference to No.1218/s dated 7 March 1951

The 2nd Chief Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army is not conducting espionage operations among prisoners of those nationalities which you indicated, who are being held in camps of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea.

original signed M. SHALIN

"lO" March 1951

[handwritten "True Copy: Zamtsov]

No.998787

[TFR 42-9]

[handwritten "46"]

Worker of the World, Unite! TOP SECRET

All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P84/567 [handwritten "56"]
28 Nov 1951

To Comrades Malenkov and Gromyko

Extract from Protocol No.84 Politburo TsK VKP(b) Session

Decision dated 28 November 1951

567.- Regarding the draft of the Korean Government's response to Tryugve Li on the issue of prisoners of war.

Instruct Comrade Gromyko to further examine the given matter and to present a proposal to the Politburo.

POLITBURO TsK VKP(b)

6-p

[typed along left margin "Subject to return to the 2nd Section, TsK VKP(b) Department within 7 days (by decree of PB TsK dated 5 May 27, attachment 100, paragraph 5.)"]

[TFR 42-10]

To Comrade I.V. STALIN

The USSR Ambassador to the Korean People's Democratic Republic, Comrade Razuvaev, reported that the KNDR Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pak Khen Ena, received a telegram from Tryugve Li, [acting) on behalf of the countries of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Columbia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, South Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, South African Union, Great Britain, and the USA. In the telegram Tryugve Li, referring to the Geneva Convention of 1949 regarding the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilians during wartime, proposes that Switzerland, India, or the International Red Cross (IRC) undertake the protection of the interests of prisoners of war and civilian personnel in North Korea from the aforementioned countries.

It is indicated in the telegram that analogous appeals have been dispatched to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the KNR, Chou En-lai, and to the IRC.

Tryugve Li justifies his proposals with a reference to the Geneva Convention of 1949 regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, which the KNDR Government is obligated to observe, and to the Geneva Convention of 1949 regarding the protection of the civilian population, in relation to which the KNDR Government has made no declaration.

In their response to Tryugve Li's telegram, [our] Korean friends intend to decline his proposal, making the following point. At the present time, when the representatives of the warring parties,

[TFR 42-11]

who are meeting in the Kaesong region to work out a truce agreement, are nearing a discussion on the issue of a prisoner of war exchange; the KNDR Government believes it would be inexpedient to take any additional measures with respect to prisoners of war, except those which may be agreed upon between the representatives of the warring parties during the truce negotiations.

Our Korean friends request our comments on their draft response to Tryugve Li's telegram (telegram from P'yongyang No. 1381).

The MID USSR considers it expedient to concur with the indicated draft response.

The draft resolution is attached.

Please review.

(A. Gromyko)

"27" Nov 51 [signature]
No. 225-gi

Copies sent to
Comrades: Molotov,
Malenkov,
Beria,
Mikoyan,
Kaganovich,
Bulganin,
Khrushchev.

[TFR 42-12]

[handwritten "20 Nov 51"]

Top Secret. Copy 5

to Comrade G.M. Malenkov

I am sending a draft of the telegram to Comrade Razuvaev.
Please review.

Original Signed (A. Gromyko)

"20" Nov 1951
No. 334/al

Copies sent to
Comrades Mikoyan,
Kaganovich,
Khrushchev.

Draft of the telegram to Comrade Razuvaev.
(Comrade Gromyko).

[handwritten "21 Nov decision to MID"]
[TFR 42-13]

[top line is cut off]
Top Secret

EXPEDITE

NORTH KOREA
SOVIET AMBASSADOR

1368. Tell [our] Korean friends that we concur with their opinion regarding the response to Tryugve Li's telegram on the prisoner of war matter.

At the same time, tell [our] Korean friends that, in our opinion, the response should be addressed not to Tryugve Li but to the U.N. Secretariat, since the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy do not recognize Tryugve Li as the U.N. Secretary-General.

A. GROMYKO

7p [TFR 42-14]

to the 2nd Section of the Special Department of the TsK

TOP SECRET
(from O.P.)

Worker of the World, Unite!

All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE
No. P84/6224 To Comrades Malenkov, Molotov, Gromyko.
4 December 1951

Extract from Protocol No.84 Politburo TsK VKP(b) Session

Decision dated 4 December 1951

622.- Instructs to Comrade Razuvaev regarding the KNDR Government's response to the telegram from the UN General Secretariat concerning the prisoner of war issue.

Approve the draft telegram to the USSR Ambassador to the Korean People's Democratic Republic (attached).

POLITBURO TsK VKP(b)
6-P

[typed in left margin "For your information: Comrades receiving classified documents may not transfer them or divulge their contents to anyone without the special permission of the TsK. Copying the indicated documents or making extracts from them is categorically forbidden.

A note, to include the date of receipt of the document, will be personally made on each document by the addressee and will be personally signed by the addressee.
Basis: Decree of the Plenum of the TsK RKP(B) dated 19 Aug 1924"] [TFR 42-15]

To Comrade I.V. STALIN

The USSR Ambassador to the Korean People's Democratic Republic, Comrade Razuvaev, reported that the KNDR Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pak Khen Ena, received a telegram from Tryugve Li, [acting] on behalf of the countries of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Columbia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, South Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, South African Union, Great Britain, and the USA. In the telegram Tryugve Li proposes that Switzerland, India, or the International Red Cross (IRC) undertake the protection of the interests of prisoners of war and civilian personnel in North Korea from the aforementioned countries.

It is indicated in the telegram that analogous appeals have been dispatched to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the KNR, Chou En-lai, and the IRC.

Tryugve Li justifies his proposals with a reference to the Geneva Convention of 1949 regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, which the KNDR Government is obligated to observe, and to the Geneva Convention of 1949 regarding the protection of the civilian population, in relation to which the KNDR Government has made no declaration.

In their response to Tryugve Li's telegram, [our] Korean friends intend to decline his proposal, making the following point. At the present time, when the representatives of the warring parties, who are meeting in the Kaesong region to work out a truce agreement, are nearing a discussion on the issue of a prisoner of war exchange; the KNDR Government believes it would be inexpedient to take any additional measures with respect to prisoners of war, except those which may be agreed upon between the representatives of the warring parties during the truce negotiations.

[TFR 42- 16]

[Our] Korean friends request our comments on their draft response to Tryugve Li's telegram (telegram from P'yongyang No. 1381).

The MID USSR considers it expedient to concur with the opinion of [our] Korean friends regarding the response to Tryugve Li's telegram.

At the same time, in the MID's opinion it would be appropriate to recommend that our Korean friends do

not address the response to Tryugve Li, but rather to the UN Secretariat, because the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy do not recognize Tryugve Li as the UN Secretary-General.

The draft resolution is attached.

Please review. (A. Gromyko)

"2" December 1951
[signature]
No.256-gi

Copies sent to
Comrades: Molotov,
Malenkov,
Beria,
Mikoyan,
Kaganovich,
Bulganin,
Khrushchev.

[TFR 42-17]

[handwritten "No. 2"]

to Comrade A. N. POSKREBYSHEV

At your request, I am reporting that during all the battles for the period from 1 Nov 50 through 6 Dec 51, our air force and anti-aircraft artillery in Korea shot down 569 enemy aircraft.

Our fighter aviation has shot down 510 aircraft:

B-29	-	40
B-26	-	1
B-45	-	2
F-94	-	8
F-86	-	172
F-84	-	132
F-80	-	101
F-51	-	22
Meteor 4	-	32

Our anti-aircraft artillery has shot down 59 aircraft.

Our losses were 63 MiG-15s and MiG-15bis, and 30 fliers. In the anti-aircraft units, there were 29 men killed and 53 wounded.

SHTEMENKO

9 Dec 51

[TFR 42-18]

[handwritten "No. 3"]

[handwritten "Document given by the Chinese side in 1951"]

TABLE
on the number of prisoners of war
in North Korean camps

Name of Camp	Nationality	Number of POWs Officers	NCOs	Enlisted	Total
1. Khekiseki	American	108	819	811	1738
	Negroes	5	236	148	389
	British	-	2	2	4
	Turkish	2	27	86	115
2. Ts'kotsin	American	-	-	369	369
	British	-	-	7	7
	French	-	-	12	12
3. Sukan	American	8	-	116	124
	British	5	-	125	130
4. Kinka	American	-	-	1	1
	Negroes	-	-	1	1
5. Pyongyang	American	13	6	6	25
	Negroes	-	-	5	5
	British	-	1	4	5
Total	American	119	825	1303	2257
	Negroes	5	236	154	395
	British	5	3	138	146
	Turkish	2	27	86	115
	French	-	-	12	
OVERALL TOTAL		141	1091	1693	2925

12

[TFR 42-19]

[handwritten "No. 6"]

Top Secret
Copy No.

Comrade A.N. POSKREBYSHEV

I am sending two copies of the minutes of the meeting between Comrade Stalin and Chou En-lai on 19 Sep 52.

[signature]

"30" Sep 52

[handwritten "1061-VK"]

[TFR 42-20]

[handwritten "No. 7"]

MINUTES OF THE MEETING

BETWEEN COMRADE STALIN with CHOU EN-LAI

19 Sep 52

Attending: Comrades Molotov, Malenkov, Beria
Mikoyan, Bulganin, Vyshinskij

Li Fu-Chun', Chzhan Behn'-Tyan',
Su Yuj, Shi Chzheh.

STALIN, beginning the meeting with the Mexican proposal on the exchange of prisoners of war, says that we agree with Mao Tse-tung that the Mexican proposal is unacceptable because it reflects the US position in the Korean negotiations. If the Mexicans bring up their proposal in the UN, then the Soviet delegation will veto the proposal, as it is not in accordance with the interests of ending the war in Korea. The Soviet delegation will then add the following:

"1. Immediate cessation of hostilities in the air, on the land, and on the sea.

2. Return of all prisoners of war to their homelands in accordance with international standards.

3. Withdrawal from Korea of foreign troops, to include the Chinese volunteer units, over the course of 2-3 months; and peaceful settlement of the Korean matter in the spirit of Korean unification conducted by the Koreans under the observation of a commission consisting of directly interested parties and other governments, to include governments not participating in the Korean War."

He adds that which and how many governments should participate in this commission can be discussed and decided as well.

Concerning the proposal that both sides temporarily withhold twenty percent of the prisoners of war and that they return all of the remaining prisoners of war - the Soviet delegation will not

[TFR 42-21]

2.

touch this proposal and it remains in reserve for Mao Tse- tung.

CHOU EN-LAI asks what we think about the possibility of the Chinese Government concluding a nonaggression pact with India and Burma. Mao Tse-tung believes that concluding such a pact would be expedient.

STALIN replies that we adhere to the opinion of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. It goes without saying that there cannot and will not be any obstacles.

CHOU EN-LAI asks if it is possible to delay proposal of the second position, to wait 2-3 weeks.

STALIN answers that this is a matter for Mao Tse-tung. If Mao Tse-tung desires, then at the Assembly we can introduce a discussion of the second position on the percentage to be withheld.

CHOU EN-LAI raises a question regarding the third position, about the possibility of handing over prisoners of war to neutral countries in order that their fates be decided independently. He says that this is being discussed in international circles. He asks if Comrade Stalin considers it possible to support this position.

STALIN replies that we want a return of all prisoners of war. This corresponds with the Chinese position. If an agreement cannot be reached on the basis of this, then prisoners of war cannot be handed over to the UN because the UN is a combatant.

[TFR 42-22]

3.

He asks to which country the prisoners of war should be sent, based on the opinion of our Chinese comrades.

CHOU EN-LAI answers, Mao Tse-tung instructed me to say here that he has India in mind.

STALIN asks at whose expense will the prisoners of war be maintained. Apparently, at the expense of each of the appropriate parties?

CHOU EN-LAI answers that it is understood that if prisoners of war are to be handed over to India, then after some time they will be transferred through India to China. Then the Chinese and Korean sides will pay for the maintenance of the Korean and Chinese prisoners of war.

STALIN says that the proposal could be accepted, but one must keep in mind that the Americans do not want to hand over all the prisoners of war. The Americans will keep some of them, intending to recruit them. It was like this with our prisoners of war: every day now we catch several [former] prisoners of war whom the Americans send to our country. They detain prisoners of war not because, as the Americans often claim, the prisoners say that they do not want to return, but in order to use the prisoners for espionage.

CHOU EN-LAI acknowledges that this is exactly how it is.

He raises a question about the next point: to cease fire, and then discuss the issue of prisoners of war

altogether later. He reminds us that Comrade Stalin has agreed to such a position if no proposal can be reached regarding the percentage of prisoners to be withheld.

STALIN acknowledges that this proposal can be interpreted as one of several possible positions, however the Americans are not likely to agree.

[TFR 42-23]

4. CHOU EN-LAI says that the Americans may propose this at the Assembly.

STALIN. That would be fine.

CHOU EN-LAI says that in the previous meeting, Comrade Stalin mentioned that China should take the initiative in creating a continental or regional UN. He asks if there will be any further guidance on this matter.

STALIN answers that he has not changed his point of view. He adds that in addition to the existing UN, there should be an Asian UN, a European UN and so forth. This is not to replace the UN, but to operate parallel to the UN. Let the Americans create an American organization, the Europeans - a European, the Asians - an Asian; but parallel with the UN and not against it.

CHOU EN-LAI says that China has no personal interest in the UN. To the Chinese it is clear that the initiative in creating a continental organization must be taken.

STALIN emphasizes that the UN is an American organization, and that it must be destroyed, but under the guise of respect for the UN. We do not say that it must be undermined, that this organization must be weakened; but in reality we weaken the organization.

He reminds us that during the war Churchill proposed the creation of a continental UN, but he met resistance from the Americans. We kept silent while listening to this argument, but then the British abandoned their position; and we supported the proposal for the creation of the UN. [TFR 42-24]

5.

CHOU EN-LAI asks if there will be a letter from Comrade Stalin to Mao Tse-tung on this issue.

STALIN explains that it is better to manage without a letter; that he sees that Chou En-lai is taking notes and that he trusts him fully.

CHOU EN-LAI touches on the Peace Congress in Peking, set to begin at the end of September, saying that the Congress must be moved to the beginning of October. He adds that China is fighting for Japanese and Indian participation at the Congress.

STALIN asks if Pakistan will be there.

CHOU EN-LAI acknowledges that Pakistan should also take part and that the Pakistanis have been invited; however, the Pakistani Government is not issuing passports. As regards India, some members of the Indian delegation have already departed for the Congress. The Japanese are arriving via Hong Kong.

STALIN further says that a policy in which the main role belongs to the KNR must now be pursued, because:

1) the initiative to convene the Congress belongs to China;

2) it would be better, since the USSR is only partially in Asia, but China is entirely in Asia, that China have the main role.

CHOU EN-LAI asks what concrete measures will be taken by our delegation.

STALIN answers: peace.

CHOU EN-LAI talks about Nehru's proposal on convening a conference of five countries - the Soviet Union, China, England, France and the US.

MOLOTOV explains that it was the proposal of the Party Committee of the National Congress. [TFR 42-25]

6.

STALIN says that this proposal must be supported.

CHOU EN-LAI emphasizes that at such a conference, India without a doubt will be on England's side; however, it appears that it would be expedient to use this proposal.

STALIN agrees with this.

CHOU EN-LAI says that in light of the note published on the Port Arthur position, which the KNR must take in relation to Japan, it is completely clear. The KNR must show that Japan does not want to conclude a peace treaty with China and the Soviet Union.

STALIN adds, "and is preparing for aggression." He emphasizes that our position is not directed against the Japanese people.

CHOU EN-LAI raises the question on Formosa. He says that since the Japanese government has concluded an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek, it has thus confirmed that it ignores the interests of the Chinese people. This prohibits the possibility of concluding a peace treaty. As long as a treaty exists with Formosa, a peace treaty between Japan and the KNR is not possible.

STALIN emphasizes that the note on Port Arthur is directed against America, and not against the Japanese people. America maintains a fleet in Taiwan and exploits Taiwan. He supports the correctness of Chou En-lai's point of view on the impossibility of a peace treaty between the KNR and Japan, as long as Japan keeps a peace treaty with Chiang Kai-shek. He indicates that the fact that the treaty was signed between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek only worsens Japan's position.

CHOU EN-LAI asks what will be the further development of events on the matter of Germany. [TFR 42-26]

7.

STALIN says that it is difficult to predict. Evidently, the Americans will not agree to a unification of Germany. They have plundered Germany. If the West and East Germans unify, then it will not be possible to [continue to] plunder Germany. Therefore, the Americans do not want a unified Germany.

CHOU EN-LAI expresses the opinion that although the Americans are rebuilding the armed forces of West Germany and Japan, in hopes of using them, the weapons may be turned against them.

STALIN says that this is absolutely possible, even if Germany will be headed by nationalists and Hitlerists.

CHOU EN-LAI turns to the situation in Sin'tszyan [Sinkiang?]. He says that the work in Sin'tszyan is going well overall and that agricultural reforms are being realized in Sin'tszyan. Leftist excesses, however, are taking place in the illegal confiscation of livestock, in the area of religion, and in the area of lowering interest on loans and land rents. In an effort to do away with these excesses, a TsK plenum was

convened. At the plenum, Van Chzhen was removed from the duties of secretary of the Sin'tszyan Podburo[sic] of the TsK KPK, and a number of TsK members were sent to liquidate excesses on the spot. In general, the dissatisfaction, which had a place here, has been liquidated; the instances of defection, to include those to the USSR, have been put to an end. STALIN says that the excesses are a result of attempts to quickly obtain land and livestock which had been confiscated from the wealthy.

CHOU EN-LAI remarks that, as soon as the rumour of reform spread, hostile elements immediately began to slaughter livestock. [TFR 42-27]

[handwritten "98"]

8.

STALIN remarks that similar incidents even took place in the corresponding period of our experience. Reform must be speeded up. If agrarian reform is not carried out, then such looting will continue into the future.

CHOU EN-LAI clarifies that agrarian reform is being carried out in agricultural regions; however, distribution and its accompanying excesses are done in other, livestock-rearing regions. Since shepherds participate in the distribution, the Chinese leadership has adopted the decision to improve the shepherds' condition, which should improve the general condition.

STALIN says that you [the Chinese], of course, know best.

CHOU EN-LAI says that according to Lyu Shao-tsi's report, two Indonesian Communist Party representatives should come to the XIX Congress. He asks whether it will be timely to discuss party matters with them in Moscow.

STALIN says that for now, it is difficult to say. It depends on whether they turn to the TsK for advice. He points out that when the Indian Communist Party representatives came, they asked us to help them in the matter of determining a Party program; this had to be done, despite our heavy workload.

CHOU EN-LAI reports that our Japanese comrades should also come, and more than likely will also want to discuss party affairs.

STALIN answers that big brothers cannot refuse their little brothers in such a case. He says that this will need to be talked over with Lyu Shao-tsi because he has much experience, and we will need to clarify how our Chinese friends feel about this.

CHOU EN-LAI points out that Lyu Shao-tsi intends [TFR 42-28]

[handwritten "99"]

9.

to take appropriate materials with him in order to discuss a number of matters.

STALIN remarks that if our Chinese comrades want to discuss these matters, then of course there will be no objections from our side; and if they do not want to, then there will be no need to talk.

CHOU EN-LAI says that the Chinese comrades, without a doubt, will want to talk.

STALIN answers that in that case, time will be found.

CHOU EN-LAI says that it cannot be excluded that our Vietnamese friends will also come.

STALIN remarks the Vietnamese comrades are our friends and will be our guests.

CHOU EN-LAI, concluding the meeting, says that these are all the matters on which they would like instruction.

STALIN asks, "instruction or advice?"

CHOU EN-LAI answers that from the point of view of Comrade Stalin, this is perhaps advice, but in its presentation it is instruction.

STALIN remarks to this that we only give advice, we lay out our opinion. Our Chinese comrades can take it or not. Instruction carries with it an obligatory character.

CHOU EN-LAI repeats that from the Chinese point of view, it is instruction, and most valuable instruction at that. He remarks that they do not blindly accept these instructions, but consider it necessary to understand and consciously accept these instructions.

STALIN emphasizes that we know little about China and therefore are careful about giving instructions. [TFR 42-29]

[handwritten "100"]

10.

CHOU EN-LAI says that they are basing this on the fact that without a doubt, Comrade Stalin is quite familiar with precisely those matters which we are addressing. He again asks whether there will be any instructions.

Comrade STALIN answers that our advice is this: one must remember that the British and Americans will be trying to supply the Chinese government apparatus with their own people, their own agents. It is all the same whether they are Americans or French. They will carry out subversive work, attempt to corrupt from within, and may even resort to criminal action, such as poisonings. Therefore, caution is required. He says that this must be kept in mind. These are the only instructions.

CHOU EN-LAI says that these are very valuable instructions. He agrees that not only may the Americans, British and French resort to vile deeds, but they may also incite the Chinese to such deeds.

STALIN adds, "and their own agents from the national bourgeoisie."

MOLOTOV returns to the matter of military credit, concerning payment of the cost of arming 60 Chinese divisions. He asks whether he correctly understood Chou En-lai the last time in that the cost of the delivery for 60 divisions does not apply to the military credit given by the Soviet Government to China under the agreement of 1 Feb 51. The delivery of arms for 60 Chinese infantry divisions will be paid in full by credit being given under special agreement between China and the Soviet Union.

CHOU EN-LAI answers that Comrade Molotov correctly understood him, and once again acknowledges that the calculations [TFR 42-30]

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11.

relating to arming the 60 Chinese divisions should be carried out with a complete payment, and not with a half payment, as it was not established for China.

STALIN says that in that situation it is necessary to sign a special agreement.

Further, he touches on the gifts from the Chinese Government to representatives of the Soviet Union, and points out that there are very many gifts.

CHOU EN-LAI explains that they were unable to present gifts to Comrade Stalin in time for his 70th birthday. They were in the gift museum, saw the gifts sent from other countries, and decided that they had to make up for what they could not do on time.

STALIN says that we would also like to present the Chinese Government delegation with automobiles of Soviet make. He says that we have "ZIM" automobiles, which are smaller than the "ZIS", but are very attractive, and we would like to present these "ZIMs". Then the matter of relations with Sun Tsin-lin was touched upon.

CHOU EN-LAI says that she is working on becoming more in touch with herself; that she gradually is switching from bourgeois ideology to their camp; [that she] makes good speeches based on our ideology. He says that Sun Tsin-lin is proud that she is a Laureate of the International Stalin Peace Prize.

The Meeting began at 1030 and ended at 1230.

Recorded by: [signature] (A. Vyshinskij)
[signature] (N. Fedorenko)

[handwritten on reverse "Arkhiv Presidenta RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, l. 90-101"]

[TFR 42-31]

[handwritten "No. 8"]

December 1952 [handwritten "Copy"]
3/[handwritten "5/36712"] [handwritten "Top Secret"]

[in a typeface different from the rest of text "SPECIAL ADVISORY"]

on the detention of two American intelligence officers by state security organs of Northeast China.

On 5 Dec of this year, LI-NAN', Head of the Directorate for State Security, Chinese People's Republic, Port Arthur Region, informed the Department Head of the Counterintelligence Department, MGB, 39th[?] Army that on 3 Dec of this year in the province of Girin, as a result of a ploy conducted by the Department of State Security, Northeast China (city of Mukden), an American aircraft was allowed to land.

Among the aircraft crew members were two intelligence officers, US Army Lieutenant Colonels, who arrived to brief agent-saboteurs that were earlier airdropped into Northeast China.

The above-mentioned American intelligence officers are in Mukden.

DEPARTMENT HEAD, CHIEF DIRECTORATE
OF THE MGB, USSR

Printed 5 copies:
1st - [handwritten "Comrade Goglidze"]
2nd -
3rd -
4th -
5th -

[handwritten "to Goglidze and Comrade Ogol'tsov"]
[There appears to be some missing handwritten instructions below this heading]

[TFR 42-32]

[handwritten "No. 9"]

[handwritten "Copy"]
[handwritten "Top Secret"]

to: Comrade G.M. MALENKOV
Comrade L.P. BERIA
Comrade H.A. BULGANIN

I am reporting that, according to the report from the MGB USSR advisor in China, 9 crewmembers of an aircraft from the 91st Reconnaissance Detachment, American Strategic Aviation, which was shot down in the area of An'dun on 12 Jan 53, were taken prisoner. The chief of communication services and supply, Colonel EHNNOT, and the staff officer of operational reconnaissance service, 91st Detachment, Major BAUL (last names were given in Chinese transcription), were also on the aircraft. On the instructions of the TsK Communist Party of China, they will be sent to Peking and subjected to interrogation.

The Minister of Public Security of China, having reported on 27 Jan 53 to our advisor on this decision of the TsK KPK, requested that our advisor help the Chinese investigators organize the interrogation of the prisoners of war and check their work.

The MGB USSR advisor was ordered by us to render such help.

S. IGNAT'EV

"29" Jan 53
No. 333/I

[TFR 42-33]

[handwritten "No. 10"]

[handwritten "28"]
[handwritten initials "DS"]

Subject to return within 24 hours to the Special Sector, Directorate of Affairs USSR Council of Ministers

Top Secret
(Special Folder)
[handwritten "60"]

to Comrade G.M. MALENKOV

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, USSR
dated "19" Mar 53 No. 858-372ss
Moscow, The Kremlin

DECREE

The MID Issue.

The USSR Council of Ministers DECREES:

1. Approve the attached draft of the letter from the Government of the USSR addressed to Mao Tse-tung and Kim Il Sung (Attachment No. 1).

Transmit this letter to Comrade Mao Tse-tung through Comrade Chou En-Lai and Comrade V.V. Kuznetsov, and to Comrade Kim Il Sung through Comrade Malik, who will be sent immediately to P'yongyang.

2. Approve the Soviet delegation directive at the General Assembly (Attachment No. 2).

[Circular seal for "DIRECTORATE OF AFFAIRS, USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS - PROTOCOL SECTION"]

Chairman
USSR Council of Ministers G. Malenkov

Director of Affairs
USSR Council of Ministers M. Pomaznev

[along left edge of page "Note: It is categorically forbidden to make copies or extracts of this Decree. The comrade to whom the document is addressed is to personally sign and date each document."]

Copy No. 2 [TFR 42-34]

Attachment No. 1

The Soviet Government has thoroughly examined the Korean War issue in the context of the present situation while taking into account the entire course of events of the previous period. As a result, the Soviet Government has come to the conclusion that it would be wrong to continue the policy which has been pursued until recently without incorporating into that policy those changes which apply to the current political situation and proceed from the deep interests of our peoples - the peoples of the USSR, China and Korea, who are interested in securing peace for the entire world and have always searched for acceptable means to the quickest possible end to the war in Korea.

There is no need to dwell at great length on what the aggressor has committed during the war in Korea. In the eyes of honorable people from all over the world, the actions of the aggressive Anglo-American block in Korea - especially the aggressive US forces - more and more expose this block as an international factor which carries out the politics of preparing a new war and is ready to move to the politics of spreading war for the sake of dictating to the people its aggressive imperialistic will that expresses a striving for world domination and for the subjugation of peoples to their imperialistic goals.

The Soviet Government believes that we must henceforth deal with all these important circumstances of international order, just as we have dealt with them up to now. This does not mean, however, that under the conditions of the current [TFR 42-35]

[Second page is missing] - 3 -

4. We also consider it expedient that the speech of the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, which accordingly fully supports the Peking and P'yongyang speeches, should take place in Moscow immediately after the speeches stipulated above in Peking and in P'yongyang.

5. In accordance with the four measures listed above, the Soviet delegation at the UN General Assembly in New York must do everything necessary to appropriately support and advance this new political aim

which has been stated above.

We consider it necessary to give the following clarification of the above statement:

First. On the response to GeneralClark. We feel that in Kim Il Sung's and Pyn De-khueh's letter in answer to General Clark, it is necessary to express complete approval with Clark's proposal to conduct an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, with added instructions that a favorable resolution of this matter in accordance with Article 109 of the Geneva Convention must be kept in mind.

Point out in the reponse to Clark that the issue of exchanging sick and wounded prisoners of war is of very important significance for the successful resolution of the overall prisoner of war issue, and hence, for the successful resolution of the issue regarding ceasing the war and concluding a truce. With this in mind, suggest renewing the negotiations between the chief representatives of both parties on the armistice talks in Panmunjom.

Propose that liaison officers from both parties establish the date of these negotiations. [TFR 42-36]

- 4 -

During these negotiations on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war in accordance with Article 109 of the Geneva Convention which stipulates that "not one sick or wounded prisoner of war will be repatriated against his will during a time of military action," obtain a guarantee from the American Command Staff that, as regards the stated prisoners of war, under no circumstances will coercion be employed with the aim of hindering their return to their homelands.

Also propose establishing a commission of representatives from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Switzerland to render assistance in returning sick and wounded prisoners of war to their homelands.

In the negotiations on exchanging sick and wounded prisoners of war, proceed from the fact that the task is not only to achieve a positive resolution of the matter mentioned above, but also to achieve a positive resolution of the entire prisoner of war issue, and hence, to remove obstacles to achieving an agreement on ceasing military action and concluding an armistice. Article 109 of the Geneva Convention must be used for this, and especially the second paragraph of the Article stipulating for the conclusion of an "agreement on the repatriation or internment in a neutral country of healthy prisoners of war who have spent long periods in captivity."

During the negotiations, propose that all prisoners of war insisting on repatriation be immediately [TFR 42-37]

[handwritten "65"] - 5 -

repatriated, while the remainder are to be transferred to a neutral country in order to secure an equitable resolution on the matter of their repatriation.

As regards these prisoners of war, strive to achieve a classification by nationality and by place of residence, as was proposed in the letter from Kim Il Sung and Pyn De-khueh of 16 Oct 52 to General Clark (this also corresponds to the Indian draft on Korea).

After classification, the prisoners of war immediately receive the right to return to their homelands, which will be facilitated by the assistance of all interested parties.

Second. On the statement in Peking. In this statement, it would be expedient to say that the KNR Government discussed the issue posed by General Clark with the KNDR Government. Both the KNR Government and the KNDR Government came to the same conclusion on the necessity to give their representatives in Panmunjom instructions to enter into negotiations with General Clark on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, while bearing in mind the attainment of a positive resolution on the

prisoner of war issue as a whole. Point out in the statement that during the negotiations between both sides in Kason and Panmunjom, both parties reached an agreement on all matters except on the matter of prisoners of war.

Thus, an agreement was reached that the commanders of the armed forces of both parties "will issue an order on the [TFR 42-38]

- 6 -

complete cessation of all types of military action in Korea by all armed forces under their commands, to include all units and personnel of ground, air and naval forces. [The order] will go into effect twelve (12) hours after the signing of the armistice agreement. The fulfillment of the aforesaid order is to be ensured".

The following important conditions of the armistice were also agreed upon:

1) On the establishment of a military demarcation line which is to run along the line of contact of forces fighting on the day the armistice enters into force, that is the front line, and from which "forces of both parties will withdraw 2 kilometers in order to form a demilitarized zone..." (paragraph one of the draft agreeement on the armistice).

2) On the establishment of a military armistice committee made up of 10 senior officers, five of which will be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of UN forces, and five will be appointed by the command staff of the Korean People's Army and the command staff of the Chinese volunteers (paragraph 19). The commission is to oversee that the armistice agreement is observed, to include overseeing the committee's work on prisoner of war repatriation and to regulate, by means of negotiation, possible armistice agreement violations (paragraphs 24 and 25).

3) On creating a commission of neutral countries to oversee the armistice. [The commission] is to consist of representatives of Sweden and Switzerland, appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of UN forces [TFR 42-39]

[seventh page is missing] - 8 -

... The KNR Government (KNDR Government), for its part, is prepared to take measures to eliminate disagreements on this matter, which presently are the only obstacles to concluding the cease fire and armistice agreement. To this end, the KNR Government proposes that all prisoners of war insisting on repatriation be immediately repatriated, and the remaining prisoners of war be sent to a neutral country in order to ensure a fair resolution on the matter on their repatriation.

It is also necesary to talk about the following in the Peking statement:

Our new step, directed towards ending the war in Korea, must also serve towards the positive resolution of a number of important and pressing international matters and, above all else, towards the restoration of the rights of China and Korea in the UN.

Third. On the statment in P'yongyang. We believe that Comrade Kim Il Sung should indicate in this statement that the above mentioned statement of the KNR representative was mutually worked out by the KNR and KNDR governments and is in complete agreement with the evaluation of the political situation and the specific conclusions and proposals contained in the Peking statement. Moreover, emphasize not only the full support but also the fairness of the statement by the KNR representative.

Fourth. On the statement in Moscow. We believe it expedient that the statement by the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs in Moscow should follow immediately after these speeches in Peking and P'yongyang. We see the purport of the Moscow statement as being to stress before the whole world the complete [TFR 42-40]

solidarity and coordination of actions between the USSR, KNR and KNDR on the Korean War issue.

Fifth. On the Soviet delegation at the UN General Assembly in New York. It is incumbent on the Soviet delegation at the General Assembly to act in conformity with the entire political plan stated above in regard to the war in Korea. In this connection, it is imperative that, as soon as discussion arises at the General Assembly on the Polish draft of the resolution "on averting the threat of a new world war," the Soviet delegation provide for the inclusion of corresponding changes to the draft in the part that concerns Korea. The speeches from the Soviet delegation and the delegations of Poland and Czechoslovakia are also necessary.

Sixth. Additional remarks. It goes without saying that we are unable to foresee at this time all the steps and measures which must be taken by representatives of the USSR, KNR and KNDR. However, if full coordination is achieved between our representatives in pursuing a general policy on the given matter, and we fully hope for this, then everything else can be agreed upon as this affair progresses.

5-p [TFR 42-41]

Attachment No. 2

DIRECTIVES

FOR THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. Instruct the USSR delegation (Comrade Vyshinskij) to speak in strong support of the recent KNR and KNDR proposals and statements at the forthcoming discussion of the Polish delegation's proposals, especially those concerning the Korean issue, at the General Assembly.

After expounding the Soviet Union's position on the exchange of prisoners of war as being a position which fully conforms to universally recognized principles of human rights and to the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention that require the repatriation of all prisoners of war, the USSR representative should point out the following: the Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed recommending to the warring parties in Korea to immediately and completely cease hostilities on the ground, on the sea, and in the air.

At the Soviet Union's initiative, in June of 1951 in Kaesong, negotiations were started between the warring parties regarding the cease fire and an armistice in Korea. These negotiations led to an agreement by the parties on all issues, except on the issue regarding repatriation of prisoners of war. The Soviet Union continues to believe that the position taken by the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is fair and fully meets the principles of international rights and international practices, and also meets the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention. The Soviet Union completely supports this position. [TFR 42-42]

The only unresolved issue in the negotiations between the warring parties in Korea is the exchange of prisoners of war. The KNR and KNDR Governments have stated their willingness to take measures towards settling this matter in order to remove the last obstacle to the cessation of war in Korea and the conclusion of an armistice.

The Soviet Union welcomes the noble initiative of the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in this matter. The Soviet Union fervently supports the proposal to resume negotiations in Korea aimed at achieving an agreement on exchanging sick and wounded prisoners of war and also on settling the entire prisoner of war issue and, consequently, on ceasing the war in Korea and concluding an armistice.

Instruct the Soviet delegation at the General Assembly to come to an agreement with the Polish delegation on including the following changes to the draft of the Polish resolution on averting the threat of a new world war in the section concerning the Korean issue: In place of the old text paragraph "b)" (on the return of all prisoners of war to their homeland) include the following text: "b) the immediate resumption of armistice negotiations with the concurrent intent that the parties will exert maximum effort to achieve an agreement both on exchanging sick and wounded prisoners of war and on the entire prisoner of war issue; thus, they will exert efforts to remove the obstacles hindering the cessation of the war in Korea." 5-p [TFR 42-43]

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Workers of the world, unite! TOP SECRET

Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE No. P14/I 9 Jul 53

Extract from Protocol No.14 Presidium TsK Session on 4 Jul 53

On the draft of Kim Il Sung's and Pyn Deh-khuaj's response to Clark's letter dated 29 Jun 53.

Instruct Comrades Malenkov and Molotov to answer our Chinese comrades on the Soviet Union's agreement with their evaluation and their projected measures for the armistice negotiations in Korea in regard to Clark's letter dated 29 Jun 53.

SECRETARY of the TsK

[Printed along left-hand margin "Subject to return to the office of the Presidium of the TsK KPSS within 7 days"]

4-p [handwritten "Response - look at the file for outgoing cipher from Molotov to Peking No. 13464 dated 4 Jul 53] [TFR 42-44]

Cipher Telegram — Top Secret
DO NOT COPY

Copy No. 1-t Lay out	No. 10-t Pervukhin	No. 19-t File
" No. 2-t Malenkov	No. 11-t Vyshinskij	No. 20-t
" No. 3-t Molotov	No. 12-t Gromyko	No. 21-t
" No. 4-t Voroshilov	No. 13-t Zorin	No. 22-t
" No. 5-t Krushchev	No. 14-t Pushkin	No. 23-t
" No. 6-t Bulganin	No. 15-t Podtserob	No. 24-t
" No. 7-t Kaganovich	No. 16-t Grigor'yan	No. 25-t
" No. 8-t Mikoyan	No. 17-t Copy	No. 26-t
" No. 9-t Saburov	No. 18-t 10th Department	No. 27-t

from PEKING No. 17286 23 hrs 40 min 3 Jul 53 copy No. 21
17281 17289 17306
17287 17307 17309
17315 17308 17313

Special Nos. 1211-1220

EXTRAORDINARY

On 3 Jul at 0330 hrs, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs U Syu-shchoan', on the instructions of Chou En-lai, arrived at the Embassy and delivered Kim Il Sung's and Pyn Deh-khua's draft response to Clark's letter dated 29 Jun (it is proposed to send the response to Clark on 5 Jul). Syu-schoan' also delivered a note which expounds the KNR Government's evaluation of the current status of armistice negotiations

and states the measures planned in regard to Clark's letter.

The full text of these documents is produced below.

"The present status of the armistice negotiations and the measures with regard to Clark's letter.

Status of negotiations. During the last 12 days, while Syngman Rhee has freed prisoners of war and has been spreading

[Printed along left-hand margin "Subject to return to the 10th Department of the MID USSR within 18 hours from receipt"] [TFR 42-45]

17286 - 2 - copy No. 2

a campaign against the armistice, the US, after having reached a deadlock in the Korean war, is on the whole exhorting Syngman Rhee to lessen his campaign against the armistice and to come to a compromise.

In order to placate Syngman Rhee, the Americans are attempting to conclude a temporary agreement with him. This would afford the opportunity to sign an armistice agreement and would permit the US a way out of this current difficult situation. However, Syngman Rhee is seriously endeavoring to involve the Americans in his plans. He cannot content himself with the signing of a temporary agreement. He continues to put forth demands that the political conference be limited to three months, after the expiry of which hostilities would resume. He also demands the right to veto at the conference. These demands run contrary to US resolve to cease the war. Moreover, the two- day negotiations between the US and Syngman Rhee on this matter have reached an impasse. The Americans are now leaning towards putting pressure on Syngman Rhee.

Given the situation stated above, Clark suddenly on 29 Jun answered Kim Il Sung's and Pyn Deh-khua's letter. The aim of his letter was as follows: First, to show Syngman Rhee that concessions have limits and that the US cannot concede any further; and to attempt to sign the armistice agreement without paying attention to Syngman Rhee's opposition. Second, to show us which limitations [TFR 42-46]

[handwritten "138"]

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he (Clark) has in his guarantees, to strengthen his position, he hopes, in negotiations with Syngman Rhee by signing the armistice agreement (after the armistice it will be easier to limit arms shipments to Syngman Rhee), and to drop the issue of 27,000 prisoners of war. Third, to show the entire world that the US wants to end the war.

It can be presumed that Syngman Rhee, fully understanding the US's weak points, will not compromise. However, the US plays the leading role in the Korean War and, for the sake of their own personal interests, they may increase pressure on Syngman Rhee at a critical moment. Therefore, despite the great disagreements between the US and Syngman Rhee over the armistice, it is still possible to speak about the potential of achieving an armistice in Korea and, in light of this, it can be contended that Syngman Rhee will continue minor provocations after the realization of an armistice.

Countermeasures.

Proceeding from the situation given above, and also taking into account the vacillation in US politics brought about by the complicated internal and external differences in relations with South Korea, we intend to adhere to the following line:

Maintain the initiative in achieving an armistice; secure a united position with the US as regards the

armistice in order to isolate Syngman Rhee and deliver a blow to him, and also to force the US to exert pressure on Syngman Rhee, [TFR 42-47]

17286 - 4 - copy No. 2

to deepen the external and internal differences of the Americans. In accordance with this line, it is presupposed that the following steps be taken:

1. Prepare and send an answer to Clark from Kim Il Sung and Pyn Deh-khua on 5 Jul. In the reply, agree to resuming negotiations, subject the American side to criticism and also point out the possible consequences to the political connivance carried out by the US.

The text of the response letter is attached.

2. Prepare and deliver a strike against Syngman Rhee's puppet forces before the signing of the agreement in order to move the front line south. After resumption of the meetings, point out to the opposing side that through the fault of Syngman Rhee the signing of the agreement has been protracted and therefore the situation has changed. Proceeding from the understanding that the settlement must be brought about based on the actual situation, propose readjusting the demarcation line.

One can suppose that the opposing side will agree with this proposal as a consequence of the present, difficult mutual relations with Syngman Rhee. However, it is also highly important that the opposing side not make concessions and resort to propagandistic subterfuge. In this event, we are prepared to select the appropriate moment and finally compromise, determining the demarcation line

[handwritten "X" marks in the left margin next to the last three paragraphs} [TFR 42-48]

17286 - 5 - copy No. 2

as was agreed on 17 Jun 53.

3. Prepare for the resumption of the delegation meetings after 5 July. At the meetings, the following questions will be put to the opposing side concerning the realization of the armistice agreement:

1) Adjusting the demarcation line;

2) Whether Syngman Rhee will take part in the armistice and, in this connection, the matter of a timely evacuation of forces from the demilitarized zone in accordance with the armistice agreement;

3) Will the Syngman Rhee cabal take part in the joint inspection team of the military armistice commission;

4) Laying responsibility on the American side for the return of 27,000 prisoners of war; if the American side refuses to take responsibility, then we reserve the right to raise this question for discussion at a political conference;

5) Guaranteeing security to joint teams of the Red Cross while they are questioning prisoners of war and to representatives conducting fact-finding work.

6) Ensuring that prisoners of war insisting on repatriation are not subjected to forced detention;

7) How to ensure the realization of "the rights of the commission of neutral governments for repatriation" during its resolution of the matter on the immediate repatriation

[handwritten "X" in the left margin next to the third paragraph] [TFR 42-49]

of prisoners of war and how to guarantee security to the personnel and forces of this commission;

8) On the starting time for the work of the observation commission composed of neutral governements;

9) On the armistice entering into force.

4. With the start of the delegation meetings, staff officers and translators will begin preparing for the signing of the armistice agreement. Construction of the building where the signing of the agreement will take place will also resume.

5. It can be assumed that the signing of the agreement may be projected for approximately 15 Jul. It must be announced that the Polish and Czechoslovakian representatives and their deputies in the observation committee composed of neutral governments, the members of approximately 20 inspection groups, and also the minimum number of working personnel necessary for the initial period will be arriving in Peking approximately 10 Jul. Prepare to announce this to the opposing side at the delegation meetings."

"To the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Armed Forces General Clark.

In your letter of 29 Jun 59 you admitted that the Syngman Rhee cabal's compulsory release of Korean National Army prisoners of war from prisoner of war camps and the forced detention of these prisoners of war is a serious and grievous incident. This is true. [TFR 42-50]

[Pages 7 and 8 are missing]

...to abandon the prisoner of war camp and thus conclusively frustrate the agreement on prisoners of war which was already achieved by both sides. We believe that, as regards this incident, your side must assume total responsibility and guarantee that such incidents will no longer arise.

A guarantee is contained in your letter that UN forces will at necessary points undertake feasible military measures of a preventive nature in order to ensure the realization of the armistice agreement. We consider this imperative. However, your side is declaring that it cannot reliably guarantee that the South Korean Government and its forces will observe the armistice agreement achieved by the delegations of both parties. Along with this, the Syngman Rhee cabal still continues to clamor that it "will unite Korea by military means." This statement alone is enough to testify as to who it was that initiated the aggression three years ago. If the UN forces presently continue to pander to the Syngman Rhee cabal and permit it to engage in all sorts of criminal activities in order to undermine the potential for a peaceful solution to the Korean matter, then, after the signing of the armistice agreement in Korea, just as before, this will lead to flareups of armed agression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at any moment. Therefore, we believe that your side must employ effective measures in order that the South Korean Government and its forces [TFR 42-51]

observe the armistice agreement and all other agreements relating to it. Only then will it be possible to guarantee that the armistice in Korea will not be violated.

Proceeding from the above, although your answer cannot be considered completely satisfactory, however, considering that your side expressed a desire to apply force for a quick attainment of a truce and also focusing attention on your positive statements, we agree that delegations of both sides should establish a time to meet and agree on the practical realization of the issues relating to the armistice agreement and on the various preparatory measures preceding the signing of this agreement. The date of the meeting should be set by the heads of both delegations through liason officers.

The Supreme Commander, Korean National Army
Marshall Kim Il Sung
Commander in Chief, Chinese National Volunteers
Pyn Deh-khuaj
5 July 1953."

After having delivered these documents, U Syu-tsyuan', on the instructions of Chou En-lai, orally reported the following: In the opinion of the KNR government, Syngman Rhee's recent provocative actions can be explained, on one hand, by his attempts to bargain for more US aid and, on the other hand, by his fear of the Chinese volunteers in Korea and his fear of China in general. Syngman Rhee so doggedly insists [TFR 42-52]

17286 - 11 - copy No. 2

on concluding a "mutual defense" pact with the US precisely for this reason.

Syngman Rhee's statements that if the US does not meet his demands halfway, then he will issue an order to the South Korean forces to fight to the end are mere words.

The KNR Government believes that the US will render Syngman Rhee only limited help. The US fears that if Syngman Rhee receives help on a large scale, then he may plunge into perilous, risky ventures and draw the US in also. However, it does not suit the Americans to be drawn into some kind of grand risky venture in the Far East right now. In this respect, the Americans have [illegible, perhaps an entire line missing].

There are also differences between Syngman Rhee and the US regarding the policy at the next political conference. Syngman Rhee believes that if the conference does not accept his (Syngman Rhee's) demands, then he should abandon the conference and resume a broad offensive against North Korea right up to the Yalutszyan River, or in other words up to the Korean-Chinese border. The Americans for their part think that the negotiations at the political conference should be ended only if it becomes obvious that the Korean/Chinese representatives at this conference achieve what North Korea and China could not achieve through armed means. Taking into account all of the above, the KNR Government believes it necessary in the interests of peace to sign the armistice agreement. "In this instance, - jokingly...

[Remainder of this document not available] [TFR 42-53] COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, CENTRAL COMMITTEE TOP SECRET

No. P104/24

To Comrades Suslov, Andropov, Gromyko

Extract from protocol No. 104 Presidium of the TsK KPSS Session dated 28 Jun 63

On the US Government's appeal for assistance in returning crew members of the American military helicopter that landed on KNDR territory on 17 May 63.

1. Inform the KNDR Government about US Government's appeal to the Soviet Government for assistance in returning two crew members of the US Armed Forces helicopter that landed on KNDR territory on 17 May 63 (a draft of instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in P'yongyang is attached).

2. Leave the US Government's appeal unanswered. If the Americans bring this issue up again, inform them that their appeal has been brought to the attention of the KNDR Government.

SECRETARY OF THE TsK

Subject to return within a 7-day period to the TsK KPSS (General Department, 1st Sector)

10-mm ap [TFR 42-54]

Reference: para. 24 of protocol No. 104

Secret

P'YONGYANG

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Visit the Minister of Foreign Affairs or his deputy and, after citing your mission, inform him of the following:

"The US Government through the American Embassy in Moscow has appealed to the Soviet Government with a request to show "goodwill" and render assistance in the return of American citizens - Captain Ben Uikli Statts and Captain Karelton Volts, crew members of the US Armed Forces helicopter which on 17 May 63 allegedly made a forced landing on KNDR territory.

I have been tasked with informing you about this appeal from the US Government and to let you know that for our part, it goes without saying, no promises whatsoever were given to the Americans.

We have left the American appeal unanswered. If they bring up this matter again, we intend to answer that their request has been brought to the attention of the KNDR Government."

Telegraph completion of assignment.

504-ae ap [TFR 42-55]

Secret. Copy No. 2

TsK KPSS

The US Government, through the American Embassy in Moscow, appealed to the Soviet Government with a request to show "goodwill" and render assistance in the return of two crew members of a US Armed Forces helicopter which made a "forced landing" on the territory of KNDR on 17 May 63.

According to available information, the helicopter was forced down by the Armed Forces of KNDR after it had violated the demarcation line and appeared over KNDR territory.

In a verbal report on this matter by the US Embassy it was noted that attempts by American representatives to obtain the return of the helicopter and its crew through the military armistice commission in Korea were unsuccessful; however, the American side was expecting a positive solution to the matter, especially since "UN Command Forces in Korea" on 27 May 63 transferred several North Korean fishermen who had been detained earlier to KNDR authorities.

We are unaware of the details of the incident with the American helicopter and also the intentions of our Korean comrades in connection with the incident.

MID USSR suggests it would be expedient to inform our Korean comrades about this appeal by the US Government, emphasizing during this that the Soviet side of course did not make any promises to the Americans.

It is expedient to leave the US Government's appeal unanswered. If the Americans raise this matter again, then it may be reported to them that the KNDR Government was informed of their appeal.

The draft of the Resolution is attached.

Please review.

Original Signed A. GROMYKO
" 25 " Jun 63
No. 1957 /GS
6-tb/VK
No.795ossha
18 Jun 63

True Copy: [signature]

[signature] [handwritten "[1 illegible] 1?3-46, TsK-22515"]

[handwritten on reverse "Arkhiv Presidenta RF, f. 3, op. 66, d. 372, l. 18-20"] [TFR 42-56]

[stamp "DECLASSIFIED 3 Jul 92"] [handwritten "24"]

SECRET Copy No. 15
16 Feb 68
No. 73 /dv

[handwritten "Zinchuk, Fedoseev, Sol'nov, Porshakov, [illegible signature], 19 Feb"]

[stamp "MID USSR
USA Department
SECRET
Entry No. 219
"16" Feb 68"]

ON THE DETENTION BY KNDR AUTHORITIES OF TWO AMERICAN PILOTS IN 1963 (Brief Summary)

On 17 May 63, KNDR authorities detained two American citizens - Captain Ben Uilki Statts and Captain Karelton Vol'tts, US Armed Forces helicopter crew members, who allegedly made a forced landing on KNDR territory.

On 28 Jun 63, MID KNDR reported through our Embassy in Peking that the US Government approached the Soviet Government with a request to show "goodwill" and assist in the return of these American citizens. It was reported also that no promises were made to the Americans from our side and that we have left their request unanswered. If the Americans bring this matter up again, then we intend to respond that the KNDR Government has been informed of their request.

KNDR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kho Dam stated that the American helicopter intentionally, with intelligence- gathering aims, violated KNDR air space and therefore the American pilots, as criminals, will answer in accordance with KNDR laws. He also said that the USSR Government should not assume the role of intermediary and receive such requests from the Americans, and that this matter pertains solely to the KNDR sphere of authority.

Neither the US nor the KNDR made any further appeals to Soviet representatives concerning this matter.

dv [TFR 42-57]

2.

On 3 Dec 63, the US representative delivered to UN Secretary-General U. Tan a letter of protest against the seven month detention of the indicated American pilots in North Korea. It said in the letter that the flight of the American helicopter over the demilitarized zone was the result of an error.

On 17 Feb 64, the Commander of the Korean Peoples Army, responding to the letter dated 6 Nov 63 from the "UN Forces" Commander in South Korea, American General Khauz, stated his willingness to favorably review the matter concerning the pilots if the "UN Forces" Command Staff admits to the violation of the Korean armistice agreement and makes a promise not to allow such actions in the future.

On 5 Mar 64, General Khauz sent a letter to the KNA Commander which noted in particular:

"In view of your demand, the UN Forces Command Staff confesses to the intrusion by the two stated servicemembers in the area of the demilitarized zone on 17 May 63. Moreover, we guarantee that the UN Forces Command, while taking all necessary measures in accordance with our desire to strictly adhere to the conditions of the cease fire agreement, is making every effort in order to avoid the reoccurance of a similar situation in the future."

On 23 March 1964, the leaders of the KNA stated in their response that the head of the Korean-Chinese side of the military commission is fully authorized to conclusively resolve the matter regarding the transfer of the pilots.

A year after their detention, in May 64, the pilots were returned to the American side in Panmunjom.

FAR EAST DEPARTMENT MID USSR